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Imperfect Central Bank Communication: 
Information versus Distraction 
 





Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper 
considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of 
imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect 
information is ambiguous. If the public is able to assess accurately the quality of the 
imperfect information communicated by a central bank, such communication can inform and 
improve the public’s decisions and expectations. But if not, communicating imperfect 
communication has the potential to mislead and distract. The risk that imperfect 
communication may detract from the public’s understanding should be considered in the 
context of a central bank’s communications strategy. The risk of distraction means the central 
bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. 
Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public’s understanding to the 
extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information. 
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Over the past two decades, central banks￿approach to communications has undergone a sea
change. The cultivation of secrecy and mystique has been replaced by a zeal for openness
and transparency. Although the bene￿ts of an open and transparent monetary policy
process are now widely recognized and understood, most central banks are still grappling
with exactly how best to achieve that aim. An approach of "more information is always
better" is neither su¢ cient nor correct. There are costs as well as bene￿ts associated
with communicating ever-increasing amounts of noisy and complex information. As central
banks seek to continue their progress towards greater openness, these costs and bene￿ts ￿
and their implications for the design of central bank communications ￿need to be better
understood.
This paper considers the potential bene￿ts and limitations of central bank communi-
cations in a model which emphasizes two important features of the practical environment
in which central banks operate. First, it recognizes that monetary policy is conducted
against a backdrop of imperfect knowledge: Central banks and the public have imperfect
knowledge about the structure of the economy and about the shocks a⁄ecting the economy.
Second, it argues that central bank communications should be thought about in terms of
communication strategies: All central banks publish some information, the issue faced by
central banks is how to combine various types of information in a way that best informs
the public. These two features have important implications for the analysis of central bank
communications.
That monetary policy is conducted in an environment of imperfect knowledge is central
to understanding the potential bene￿ts and limitations of central bank communications.
Foremost, it helps to motivate the importance that central banks place on communica-
tion policies. As noted by Orphanides and Williams (2006), central bank communications
have little role to play in models of rational expectations with perfect knowledge.1 The
recognition that the private sector has imperfect knowledge rationalizes the role central
bank communications can play in aiding private sector learning. But the limits on central
1In a similar vein, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federeal Open Market Committee, recently argued
that "Notably, in a world with rational expectations and in which private agents are assumed already to
understand all aspects of the economic environment, talking about the e⁄ects of central bank communication
would not be sensible, whereas models with learning accomodate the analysis of communication-related
issues quite well. .... In sum, many of the most interesting issues in contemporary monetary theory require
an analytical framework that involves learning by private agents and possibly the central bank as well"
(Bernanke, 2007).
2banks￿knowledge and understanding implies that much of the information communicated
by central banks is uncertain or imperfect, such as economic forecasts or short-term policy
guidance. This raises important issues concerning the public￿ s ability to process and utilize
imperfect, noisy information. Interpreted correctly, the communication of imperfect infor-
mation can help to inform and improve the public￿ s understanding and expectations. But if
the public are not able to assess accurately the quality of the information conveyed by cen-
tral banks, imperfect central bank communication has the potential to distract and result
in worse economic outcomes.2 Imperfect central bank communication is a doubled-edged
sword that should be used with care.
This risk of distraction is most apparent when considered in the context of a central
bank￿ s communications strategy. Central banks have a wide range of information at their
disposal. All central banks communicate some information; the challenge faced by central
banks is to decide which information to publish ￿and in what form ￿to best aid the e¢ cient
functioning of the economy. An assessment of whether or not to publish a particular piece
of information has to be made in the context of the information that is already being
communicated. Importantly, the di⁄erent types of information available to a central bank
vary considerably in terms of their precision: Information about a central bank￿ s in￿ ation
objective or the outcome of a policy meeting is more precise ￿ less imperfect ￿ than a
central bank￿ s economic forecast or guidance about the future path of policy. The risk that
the public may be unable to assess correctly the quality of the information being conveyed
means that central banks may prefer to communicate more certain information. Indeed, the
disclosure of more certain information may "crowd out" a role for communicating imperfect
information. That is, it may improve the precision of the public￿ s understanding to a point
at which it is no longer bene￿cial for the central bank to run the risk of communicating
imperfect information.
This paper considers the role of central bank communication in an environment of
imperfect knowledge and learning. Both the central bank and the private sector are assumed
to have imperfect knowledge about the structure of the model and are engaged in perpetual
learning. The risk of distraction is explored by considering the e⁄ect of publishing central
bank forecasts on the accuracy of private-sector in￿ ation expectations. Since both the
central bank and the private sector are assumed to have imperfect knowledge of the economy,
the central bank￿ s forecasts are not necessarily more accurate than those of the private
sector. If the private sector is able to assess correctly the precision of the central bank￿ s
2Similar concerns have been expressed by, for example, Issing (1999, 2000), Winkler (2000), Mishkin
(2004), Macklem (2005), Woodford (2005), King (2006) and Sibert (2006).
3forecasts, publishing the forecasts improves the accuracy of private-sector expectations.
But if the private sector is not able to assess the quality of the central bank￿ s forecasts,
the value of publishing central bank forecasts is shown to be ambiguous. In particular, the
private sector may inadvertently place too much weight on the central bank￿ s forecast and
so detract from the accuracy of its expectations.3 The importance of viewing central bank
communications as a strategy comprising numerous pieces of information is illustrated by
considering a case in which the central bank is able to announce its in￿ ation objective as
well as publish its economic forecasts. It is shown that announcing an in￿ ation target has
the potential to "crowd out" a role for publishing economic forecasts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two outlines the model and
informational assumptions, Section 3 presents the main results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The model used to explore the e⁄ects of central bank communication is highly stylized. Both
the central bank and the private sector produce forecasts of in￿ ation. The central bank is
assumed to use a structural model as the basis of its forecasting model, whereas the private
sector relies solely on a reduced-form forecasting model. The choice of models re￿ ects
the dominant forecasting strategies used by central banks and private-sector forecasters
respectively in many countries. In particular, the greater value that central banks tend to
place on understanding and explaining the "economics" underlying their forecasts means
that they often make greater use of structural economic models.4 But the assumptions
concerning the use and choice of di⁄erent forecasting models is not important for what
follows. All that matters is that the forecasts produced by the central bank and the private
sector are distinct, and that there is a possibility that the central bank￿ s in￿ ation forecasts
may be less accurate than those of the private sector.5
Importantly, the models employed by the central bank and private sector are properly
speci￿ed in the sense that they nest the correct structure of the economy and equilib-
rium dynamics that would prevail under a rational-expectations equilibrium with perfect
knowledge. The central bank and private sector update their model coe¢ cients recursively
3As discussed below, these results are qualitatively similar to those of Morris and Shin (2002), although
the mechansim underlying the results is very di⁄erent to that described by Morris and Shin.
4See, for example, Harrison et al. (2005) for a discussion of the objectives underlying the design of the
Bank of England￿ s forecasting model.
5Similar results could be obtained, for example, by assuming that the central bank and the private sector
used identical forecasting models but received di⁄erent signals concerning the state of the economy.
4using constant gains least squares. This estimation algorithm is equivalent to applying
weighted least squares where the weights decline geometrically with time.6 As discussed by
Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2006), the use of constant gain learning ￿which has the
property that learning is a never-ending (perpetual) process ￿can be justi￿ed by the central
bank and private sector allowing for the possibility of structural change and therefore plac-
ing less weight on older data. The central bank and private sector recursively update their
forecasting models each period and use their most recent estimates to generate in￿ ation
forecasts.
The e⁄ectiveness of central bank communication is evaluated according to its ability to
improve the accuracy of private-sector in￿ ation expectations. If the central bank publishes
its in￿ ation forecast, the private sector combines forecasts from its own model with those
of the central bank in order to form expectations of future in￿ ation. The weight attached
to the central bank￿ s forecast in this combination is determined by the historical forecast-
ing performance of the central bank relative to that of the private sector￿ s model, where
importantly that weight is also recursively updated using constant gain learning. That is,
the private sector is perpetually learning about the (relative) quality of the central bank￿ s
forecasts. If the central bank does not publish its in￿ ation forecast, the private sector￿ s
in￿ ation expectations are based solely on its own model forecasts.
The model employed is similar to that used by Orphanides and Williams (2004) but
has been extended in several dimensions. In￿ ation is determined according to a modi￿ed
Lucas supply function as
￿t = ￿￿e
tjt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + ￿xt + et; (1)
where ￿t is in￿ ation, ￿e
tjt￿1 is the private sector expectation of time t in￿ ation formed at






output gap for period t is determined by the central bank in period t ￿ 1 according to its
reaction function as
xt = ￿￿(￿t￿1 ￿ ￿￿); (2)
where ￿￿ is the in￿ ation target of the central bank.
Before considering the forecasting models used by the central bank and private sector,
it is useful to clarify the timing of the model. As illustrated in Figure 1, each time period is
separated into four subphases. In phase (i), in￿ ation in period t is determined and observed
by the central bank and private sector. In phase (ii), the central bank re-estimates its
model, produces its forecast for in￿ ation in period t + 1 and decides whether to publish it.
6Sargent (1993, 1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) discuss properites of constant gains learning.
5The private sector re-estimates its forecasting model in phase (iii), uses the updated model
estimates to generate its in￿ ation forecast, and forms its expectation for in￿ ation in period
t+1 based on its own in￿ ation forecast and (if published) the central bank￿ s forecast. The
private sector￿ s in￿ ation expectations for the next period are observed by the central bank.
Finally, in phase (iv), the central bank decides its policy setting (the output gap) for the
next period.
Figure 1: The timing of the model.
The central bank estimates a structural econometric model of the economy, namely
the supply function in equation (1). To capture the possibility that central banks have
imperfect knowledge of the economy, the central bank is assumed to know the correct form
of the supply function and the true value of ￿, but not the value of ￿. The central bank
therefore recursively estimates ￿ each period using constant gain least squares according to
￿t ￿ ￿￿e
tjt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 = ￿txt +  t: (3)
The regression coe¢ cient ￿t can be written as





















and ￿cb is the gain.7
7This learning algorithm is standard in the literature; see, for example, Evans and Honkapohja (2001).






1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿t￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿t; (6)
where this forecast assumes that private-sector in￿ ation expectations are formed according
to the central banks￿estimate of the reduced-form relationship that would be the solution
under full information and rational expectations.8
The private sector generates in￿ ation forecasts using the AR(1) model
￿t = c0;t + c1;t￿t￿1 + vt (7)
Just like the central bank, the private sector recursively updates its model estimates each
period using constant gain least squares and we can express the regression coe¢ cients
^ ct = (^ c0;t;^ c1;t)
0 as













￿v is the gain and Xt = (1;￿t￿1).
The model in equation (7) is then used to generate a model-based forecast for in￿ ation
according to
￿v
t+1jt = ^ c0;t + ^ c1;t￿t: (10)
If the central bank does not publish its in￿ ation forecast, the private sector￿ s in￿ ation
expectation is simply formed as ￿e
t+1jt = ￿v
t+1jt. In general though, we let the private
sector￿ s expectation for in￿ ation be based on both its own in￿ ation forecast and the forecast
published by the central bank. In particular, the private sector combines its own least
squares forecast in equation (10) with the central bank￿ s according to
￿e
t+1jt = ￿t￿v
t+1jt + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿cb
t+1jt: (11)
In line with the principle of "optimal weights" suggested by Granger and Ramanathan
(1984), the weight ￿t in this forecast combination is determined by the relative historical
forecasting performances of the private sector and central bank. However, given that the
private sector is assumed to be perpetually learning about the structure of the economy,
rather than using ￿xed weights for the forecast combination, the private sector updates the
8This assumption is made for simplicity. In principle, the central bank could, for example, estimate a
separate forecasting model for private-sector expectations and use this together with the structural model
as the basis for its in￿ ation forecasts. This would not a⁄ect the main qualitative results discussed here.
7weight each period as suggested by Diebold and Pauly (1987). Assuming that both the
private sector and the central bank are generating unbiased forecasts, the private sector









using constant gain least squares; the gain in this procedure is denoted ￿f.9 For 0 ￿ ^ gt ￿ 1
the private sector sets ￿t = ^ gt, for ^ gt < 0 it sets ￿t = 0 and for ^ gt > 1 it sets ￿t = 1.
3 Results
We start by exploring the limiting case in which the forecasting models used by both the
central bank and the private sector accurately describe the dynamics of in￿ ation. In this
case, the central bank and the private sector arrive independently at identical in￿ ation
forecasts and central bank communication has no role to play. This limiting case, which
mimics the rational-expectations, perfect knowledge outcome, serves as a benchmark against
which to consider the impact of imperfect knowledge and central bank communications. We
next turn to the intermediate case in which the central bank has perfect knowledge about
the structure of the economy and uses its forecasts to help inform the private sector. The
bene￿ts of central bank communications depend on the ability of agents to assess the quality
of the information being conveyed. We then explore the role of central bank communications
in our main case, in which both the central bank and the private sector have imperfect
knowledge about the structure of the economy. We ￿rst explore the risk of distraction in
the case in which the central bank has only one piece of information which it is able to
communicate ￿its in￿ ation forecast. We show that publishing the central bank￿ s forecast
has an ambiguous impact on the accuracy of private sector expectations depending on the
relative precision of the central bank and private sector forecasts. We then consider the
value of publishing the central bank forecast in the context of a communications strategy
in which the central bank is also able to announce its in￿ ation target. We show that
announcing an in￿ ation target may "crowd out" a role for publishing the central bank￿ s
economic forecasts.
In the baseline simulations, the parameters of the supply function are set to ￿ = ￿ = 0:5
and we let the error term have variance ￿2
e = 1. The responsiveness of monetary policy
9Interpreted literally, the suggestion that the private sector may practice constant gain learning because
of the possibility of structural change implies that ￿
v should equal ￿
f. But we allow for the possibility that
￿
v 6= ￿
f to explore circumstances in which the ability of the private sector to assess the quality of central
bank forecasts may di⁄er from their ability to produce their own forecasts.
8(in the form of the output gap) to the in￿ ation gap is set to ￿ = 0:6.10 The gains used by
the private sector in equations (7) and (12) are set to ￿v = ￿f = 0:03.11 The e⁄ectiveness
of central bank communication is evaluated by the accuracy of private sector in￿ ation
expectations, measured by their RMSE.12 For each combination of parameters, the economy
was simulated for T = 160 000 time periods; the ￿rst 80 000 observations were discarded
and the analysis accordingly based on the second half of each sample.
3.1 Perfect knowledge benchmark
The forecasting models used by the central bank and private sector nest the correct structure
of the economy that would prevail under full information and rational expectations. The
rational expectations, full-information benchmark can hence be obtained by setting the
gains used by the central bank and private sector in estimating their forecasting models to
be inversely related to the age of the data, ￿cb = ￿v = 1=t, so as t increases, ￿cb and ￿v
converge to zero.13 In this case, the estimation algorithms used by the central bank and
private sector collapse to more conventional least squares learning with in￿nite memory,
and thus the estimates of the two forecasting models converge to their correct values and
the perfect-knowledge benchmark solution is obtained. The central bank and private sector
produce identical forecasts for in￿ ation and, as such, there is no role for central bank
communication. As reported in Table 1, the RMSE of private sector in￿ ation expectations
in this case is governed by the variance of the shocks a⁄ecting the economy.14
10A value of ￿ = 0:6 would be close to optimal in the case of full information and rational expectations
if the central bank was trying to minimize a conventional loss function of the type L = !V ar(￿t ￿ ￿
￿) +
(1 ￿ !)V ar(yt) with ! = 0:5; see, for example, Orphanides and Williams (2004).
11Recall that the model is highly stylized and the results are meant only to be illustrative. However, to
aid interpretation, the calibration of the supply function (￿ = ￿ = 0:5) is similar to estimates reported by
Orphanides and Williams (2006) using quartely U.S. data. To the extent that the model can be interpreted
as quarterly, a value, for example, of ￿
v = 0:03 implies that the private sector bases its model estimates on
roughly sixteen years of data. See Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2006) for a discussion of the interpretation
of, and plausible values for, private sector gain.
12The root-mean squared error of the central bank￿ s forecasts, private sector￿ s forecast, and private sector￿ s




13Where t denotes the distance in time between the observation being weighted and the current observa-
tion.
14The RMSEs are very close to the true value of ￿
2
e. The deviation is due to random error ￿this has been
established by choosing di⁄erent random number seeds.
93.2 Intermediate case: Private sector imperfect knowledge
Consider now the intermediate case in which the central bank￿ s knowledge of the economy
is assumed to converge to the full-information case as data accumulate (i.e. ￿cb = 1=t ),
but the private sector is perpetually learning about the economy.
If the central bank does not publish its forecast, the private sector bases its expectations
solely on its own least squares forecasts from equation (10), such that ￿e
t+1jt = ￿v
t+1jt.
The results presented in Table 2 show how the RMSE of the private sector forecast, not
surprisingly, is increasing with the gain used in its least squares algorithm. That is, as the
private sector restricts the use its makes of historical data in estimating its forecast model
￿as ￿v increases ￿the precision of its forecasts (and hence its expectations) deteriorates.15
Alternatively, if the central bank publishes its forecasts, the private sector now needs to
recursively update estimates of both its forecast model (7) and the weight to attach to the
central bank￿ s forecast when forming its in￿ ation expectations. Table 3 shows the e⁄ect of
publishing the central bank￿ s forecast on the RMSE of private sector in￿ ation expectations
when ￿v = ￿f. Comparing the outcomes reported in Tables 2 and 3, it can be seen that it
is unambiguously bene￿cial for the central bank to publish its forecast. The central bank
has an informational advantage which it can use to help inform private-sector expectations.
The extent of that bene￿t depends on the private sector￿ s ability to recognize the true
value of this forecast. This can be illustrated by varying the gain ￿f used by the private
sector to estimate the weight to attach to the central bank￿ s forecast.16 Table 4 shows
that as the private sector￿ s ability to evaluate the quality of the central bank￿ s information
improves ￿that is, the value of ￿f falls ￿the private sector attaches increasing weight to
the central bank￿ s forecast and the precision of its in￿ ation expectations correspondingly
improves.
3.3 Main case: Central bank and private sector imperfect knowledge
We turn now to our central case in which both the central bank and the private sector are
assumed to be perpetually learning about the economy. We start by continuing to consider
the case in which the central bank is able to communicate only its in￿ ation forecast. That
the central bank also has imperfect knowledge about the economy means that the central
15As can be seen from Table 2, the forecasting performance of the central bank also deteriorates as ￿
v
increases. This re￿ ects the fact that, given the structure of the model, the forecasting performance of the
central bank and private sector will typically depend on each other.
16For simplicity, the gain used by the private sector to estimate its forecasting model (7) is held constant
at ￿
v = 0:03:
10bank￿ s forecasts may not necessarily be more precise than those of the private sector. This
gives rise to the possibility that if the central bank￿ s forecast is relatively noisy and the
private sector inadvertently places too much weight on this forecast, publishing the central
bank￿ s forecast may detract from the accuracy of private sector expectations: It may act
as a source of distraction.
































Central bank does not communictate any information
Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
Figure 2: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:03. ￿ = 0:60.
The e⁄ect of publishing central bank forecasts on the RMSE of private-sector expecta-
tions is shown by the upward sloping line in Figure 2.17 As in the intermediate case, the
private sector is assumed to update its forecasting equation (7) each period using constant
gain learning and forms its in￿ ation expectations by combining its own in￿ ation forecast
with the central bank￿ s forecast; in doing this, the gains ￿v and ￿f are both ￿xed at 0:03.
The e⁄ect of varying the quality of the central bank￿ s forecast is illustrated by varying the
gain used by the central bank ￿cb; as ￿cb increases, the central bank makes less use of his-
torical data to estimate its forecasting model and so the quality of its forecasts deteriorates.
By way of comparison, the RMSE of private sector expectations in the case in which the
17More detailed results are given in Tables 5 and 6.
11central bank does not publish its in￿ ation forecast is shown by the horizontal line.
Not surprisingly, when the central bank￿ s forecasts are relatively accurate ￿that is, the
central bank gain ￿cb is relatively low ￿publishing the central bank￿ s forecasts improves the
accuracy of private sector expectations relative to the case in which they are not published.
However, if the accuracy of the central bank￿ s forecast deteriorates beyond a certain point
then it is better for the central bank not to publish its forecast. That is, the RMSE of
private sector expectations is lower in the case in which the forecast is not published. The
possibility that publishing central bank forecasts may detract from the accuracy of private
sector expectations stems from the imperfect ability of the private sector to assess the
quality of the forecasts. The private sector is perpetually having to learn about the relative
quality of the central bank￿ s forecasts and so there is a risk that it may attach too little
or too much weight to the central bank forecast relative to its own forecast. If the private
sector attaches too little weight, publishing the central bank forecast still helps to improve
the accuracy of private-sector expectations, but not by its full potential. In contrast, if the
private sector attaches too much weight to the central bank forecast, there is a risk that it
will detract from the accuracy of its expectations.
The point at which publishing the central bank￿ s forecast may act as a source of dis-
traction rests on two key factors. First, it depends on the precision of the central bank￿ s
forecasts relative to that of the private sector. As the relative quality of the central bank￿ s
forecasts deteriorate, there is a greater chance that publishing the forecasts will distract the
private sector.18 Figure 3 and Table 5 illustrate the e⁄ect of publishing the central bank￿ s
forecasts for three di⁄erent levels of precision of private sector forecasts (proxied by varying
the gain used by the private sector in the algorithm used to estimate its forecasting model:
￿v = (0:01; 0:03; 0:05)).19 As the precision of private sector forecasts improves ￿that is,
the value of ￿v declines ￿the minimum level of accuracy necessary for it to be bene￿cial
for the central bank to publish its forecast becomes more strenuous.20
Second, the value of the central bank publishing its forecasts depends on the ability
of the private sector to evaluate their quality. If the private sector￿ s ability to assess the
18As the relative quality of the private sector forecast increases, the "optimal" weight to place on the
central bank forecast falls. Given that the weight that can be placed on the central bank￿ s forecast has a
lower bound of zero this implies that, as the relative quality of the private sector forecast increases, the
distribution of ￿t around the "optimal" weight becomes increasingly positively skewed.
19For simplicity, the ability of the private sector to assess the relative quality of the central bank and
private sector forecasts (proxied by ￿
f) is held constant, at ￿
f = 0:03, in all three cases.
20In the case of ￿
v = 0:05, the relatively poor quality of private-sector forecasts means that it is bene￿cial
to publish central bank forecasts even when the central bank gain increases to ￿
cb = 0:10.
12true quality of the imperfect information being communicated is relatively limited, there is
a greater chance that publishing noisy economic forecasts will mislead the private sector.
This is shown in Figure 4 and Table 6 which illustrate the e⁄ect of varying the gain ￿f used
by the private sector to estimate the weight to attach to the central bank￿ s forecasts.21 As
the ability of the private sector to assess the quality of central bank forecasts falls ￿that
is, ￿f rises ￿it becomes increasingly likely that publishing noisy economic forecasts may
distract the private sector.

































v = 0.01 Central does not communicate any information
k
v = 0.03 Central does not communicate any information
k
v = 0.05 Central does not communicate any information
k
v = 0.01 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
k
v = 0.03 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
k
v = 0.05 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
Figure 3: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gain used to combined forecasts is 0.03. ￿ = 0:60.
Several points about these results are worth noting. First, the risk that communicating
imperfect information may act as a source of distraction arises because the private sector is
not able to assess correctly the relative quality of that information. This raises the question
of whether central banks are able to provide greater guidance about the relative quality
of the information they communicate. Indeed, it is notable that central banks in recent
years have made considerable e⁄orts to convey the uncertainty associated with some of their
communications, such as with the use of so-called "fan charts" to illustrate the subjective
21Three di⁄erent values are considered ￿￿
f = (0:01; 0:03; 0:05) ￿while ￿
v is kept ￿xed at 0:03.



























Central does not communicate any information
k
f = 0.01 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
k
f = 0.03 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
k
f = 0.05 Central bank publishes inflation forecasts
Figure 4: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gain used to estimate AR(1) model is 0.03. ￿ = 0:60.
probability distribution associated with their forecasts. But although a central bank may be
able to make estimates about the absolute precision of some of its communications, that is
very di⁄erent to being able to provide estimates of the relative precision of that information,
which is likely to vary substantially across di⁄erent sectors of society. And the ability of
central banks to form estimates of even the absolute precision of much of the qualitative
information they communicate, such as speeches by policymakers or the minutes of policy
meetings, is likely to be very limited. Thus, while e⁄orts by central banks to convey the
uncertainty of the information they communicate may help to mitigate this problem, it is
unlikely to represent a complete solution.
Second, these results are qualitatively similar to those of Morris and Shin (2002) (MS),
who show that the welfare e⁄ects of increased public disclosures are ambiguous. In partic-
ular, they argue that "the better informed is the private sector, the higher is the hurdle
rate of precision of public information that would make it welfare enhancing" (Morris and
Shin, 2002). But the mechanism underlying the MS result is very di⁄erent to that consid-
ered here. MS is based around a model of information heterogeneity in which agents are
14assumed to have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their
actions. The role that public information serves as a focal point for beliefs leads agents to
attach excessive weight to such information. Thus, as the relative precision of the public
signal deteriorates, the provision of public information can be detrimental to welfare. In
the model considered here, the possibility that the private sector may attach the incorrect
weight to central bank information stems from their imperfect ability to assess the quality
of such information: Agents may attach too much or too little weight to the information.
As the relative precision of the central bank information declines, the costs associated with
attaching too much weight to the information increase, such that there is growing risk that
central bank communications may act as a source of distraction.
Finally, the results discussed so far have stressed the qualitative implications of the
model. The highly stylized nature of the model limits the inferences that can usefully be
drawn about its quantitative implications. In particular, the simplistic nature of the model
means that the results should not be interpreted as applying literally to the relative fore-
casting performance of central banks. The model ignores many of the channels through
which central bank economic forecasts may help to guide and inform private-sector expec-
tations. However, it is possible to use the ratio of the RMSE of the central bank and private
sector forecasts as a rough gauge of the relative precision at which it may become poten-
tially harmful for a central bank to communicate imperfect information. To that extent,
the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that central bank information need only
be slightly less precise than that of the private sector for it to be potentially harmful to
communicate. Thus, in the context of Svensson￿ s (2006) response to Morris and Shin (2002),
the results suggest that the information being communicated by a central bank need not
diverge very far from the "conservative benchmark" of equal precision for it to risk distract-
ing the private sector. Moreover, when considering the relative precision of the marginal
piece of information that can be communicated, it is important that it is evaluated in the
context of the information that is already being conveyed, that is, in terms of the central
bank￿ s existing communications strategy. We turn to this issue next.
3.4 Communication strategies
So far we have assumed that the central bank has only one piece of information that
it can potentially communicate, namely its in￿ ation forecasts. Thus the central bank￿ s
communication strategy boils down to a binary decision of whether or not to communicate.
But in practice all central banks communicate some information. The challenge faced
by central banks is to design a communications strategy which combines various types of
15information in a way that helps to inform private sector expectations in an e¢ cient and
e⁄ective manner. The importance of analyzing central bank communications in the context
of a communications strategy can be illustrated by considering the case in which the central
bank now has the ability to announce its in￿ ation target (￿￿), as well as publish its in￿ ation
forecast.
To the private sector, knowledge of the in￿ ation target means that it no longer has to
estimate the intercept in its econometric model.22 It can accordingly estimate the restricted
model
￿t ￿ ￿￿ = c1;t (￿t￿1 ￿ ￿￿) + vt (13)
and forecasts based on this constant gain least squares estimation are generated as
￿v
t+1jt = (1 ￿ ^ c1;t)￿￿ + ^ c1;t￿t: (14)
The private sector continues to form its in￿ ation expectations by combining its private
forecasts with the central bank￿ s forecasts in the same way as that described earlier.
Figure 5 considers the e⁄ect of four alternative communication strategies on the RMSE
of private sector expectations.23 As before, the private sector is assumed to be perpetually
learning about both the structure of the economy and about the relative quality of the
central bank￿ s forecasts; the gains used by the private sector are set to ￿v = ￿f = 0:03.
The upper two blue lines simply repeat the ￿rst results regarding communication strategies
considered in Section 3.3. The horizontal blue line shows the case in which the central bank
does not communicate any information and the upward sloping blue line the case in which
the central bank publishes only its in￿ ation forecasts. The lower two pink lines illustrate
the e⁄ect of communication strategies which involve announcing an in￿ ation target. The
horizontal pink line shows the case in which the central bank announces only its in￿ ation
target and the upward-sloping pink line considers the outcome of a communications strategy
in which the central bank both announces its in￿ ation target and publishes its in￿ ation
forecasts.
Not surprisingly, the communication strategies which include the announcement of an
in￿ ation target are unambiguously better than those which do not: Communicating infor-
mation known with certainty, such as an in￿ ation target, means there is no risk that the
private sector will place too much weight on that information.24 Moreover, comparing the
communication strategies which involve announcing an in￿ ation target, it is clear that the
22For simplicity, we assume that that the announcement of the in￿ ation target is perfectly credible.
Allowing for the possibility of imperfect credibility would not a⁄ect the qualitative results.
23Results are also shown in Tables 7 and 8.
24This assumes that the central bank is genuinely committed to achieving the announced in￿ ation target.
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Figure 5: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:03. ￿ = 0:60.
bene￿t of publishing the central bank￿ s in￿ ation forecast remains ambiguous. Once the
accuracy of the central bank￿ s forecasts falls below a certain level it is better for the central
bank to announce only its in￿ ation target, rather than also publish its in￿ ation forecast.
The importance of viewing central bank communications in the context of an overall
communications strategy can be seen by considering the central bank￿ s decision of whether
or not to publish its in￿ ation forecast. In particular, the minimum standard of accuracy
required for it to be bene￿cial for the central bank to publish its in￿ ation forecasts is more
strenuous in the case in which the central bank announces an in￿ ation target than in the
case in which it does not. This is shown in Figure 5 by the fact that the level of central
bank gain ￿cb at which the forecasts start to detract from the accuracy of private sector
expectations is lower when the central bank announces its in￿ ation target than in the case
It also assumes that the private sector￿ s knowledge of the economy is such that it is able to utilize this
information correctly. It is possible that the private sector may place too little weight on the in￿ ation
target, that is, the target is not perfectly credible. But, as noted above, this possibility does not a⁄ect the
qualitative results.
17in which it does not; the di⁄erence is given by the horizontal distance between points A and
B. The intuition for this result stems directly from the fact that the bene￿ts (and costs) of
publishing the central bank￿ s forecasts depend on the relative accuracy of the central bank
and private sector forecasts. By announcing its in￿ ation target, the central bank improves
the accuracy of the private sector￿ s forecasts and so increases the risk that publishing its
in￿ ation forecasts will act as a source of distraction. Put more generally, the ability of the
central bank to communicate more certain information has the potential to "crowd out" a
role for communicating imperfect information.
An important implication of this crowding out result is that as more information is
communicated by a central bank ￿and absorbed by the private sector ￿there is an increasing
risk that the marginal piece of information conveyed by the central bank may act as a
source of distraction.25 This will be the case even if the quality of the information being
communicated does not deteriorate. If, as seems likely, the precision of the marginal piece
of information deteriorates as central banks communicate more information, this further
heightens the risk that communicating ever-increasing amounts of information may act as
a source of distraction.
4 Conclusions
Mystique and secrecy are truly no longer the bywords of central banking. The importance of
open and transparent policy processes are widely recognized and understood. Central banks
have made huge strides in their communication policies over the past two decades. But for
many central banks, communications remain a "work in progress" (Bernanke 2007). There
is a need to better understand the design and evaluation of central bank communication
policies. The mantra of "more information is always better" is neither su¢ cient nor correct.
This paper considers the role of central bank communications in a model of imperfect
knowledge and learning. The recognition that monetary policy is conducted in an envi-
ronment of imperfect information is central to understanding both the potential bene￿ts
and limitations of central bank communications. It rationalizes the role central bank com-
25This stems from the recognition that central bank communication can aid private sector learning, that is,
the accuracy of the private sector￿ s forecasts depends on the information communicated by the central bank.
In contrast, under the heterogenous information assumptions employed by Morris and Shin (2002) among
others, the precision of the private sector￿ s information is independent of the information communicated
by the central bank. The endogeneity of the private sector￿ s understanding generated by this learning
mechanism underpins the importance of considering central bank communication in the context of the
overall communications strategy.
18munications may play in helping to inform private sector decisions and expectations. But
it also serves to emphasize that much of the information communicated by central banks
is noisy and imperfect. Such imperfect information can inform and improve the public￿ s
understanding. However, unless interpreted correctly, it also has the potential to distract
and mislead. Imperfect central bank communication is a double-edged sword that should
be used with care.
The possibility that central bank communications may detract from the public￿ s un-
derstanding is most apparent when viewed in the context of a communications strategy
comprising numerous pieces of information. As more information is conveyed by central
banks ￿and understood by the public ￿the bene￿ts of increased communication have to
be weighed against the growing risk that they will act as a source of distraction.
The central policy message of this paper is that there may be costs ￿as well as bene￿ts
￿associated with publishing ever increasing amounts of uncertain and noisy information.
If the information is too noisy relative to the private sector￿ s existing understanding, it
may be better for the central bank not to communicate it. This message may strike many
policymakers and central bank o¢ cials as little more than common sense ￿we agree. But
it is important to understand and demonstrate the mechanisms that may give rise to it.
Communicating imperfect information may be detrimental because of the limited ability
of the private sector to assess correctly the quality of that information. This suggests that
central banks should focus their communication policies on the information they know most
about.
The model considered in this paper is highly stylized and the results should not be
interpreted as literally suggesting that publishing central bank forecasts is, as a practical
matter, likely to mislead the public. Indeed, the fact that central banks in every advanced
economy now publish some form of economic forecasts suggests that experience has led
central banks to conclude that publishing information about their forecasts is useful in
informing private sector decisions and expectations. However, the risk of distraction may
help to rationalize why many central banks tend to limit the amount of forecast information
they publish to two or three key variables rather than provide detailed numerical forecasts
for a large number of variables. Likewise, it may help to explain why many central banks
appear more circumspect about publishing forecasts for the output gap or for the path of
their policy rate.
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215 Appendix
5.1 Changing the structure of the economy
As stressed in the main part of the paper, the model considered here is highly stylized,
and as such the quantitative results are likely to depend on its precise parameterization.
To illustrate this sensitivity, consider ￿rst the e⁄ect of varying the responsiveness of the
output gap to the in￿ ation gap, that is, the value of ￿.26 Two alternative values of ￿ are
considered ￿￿ = 0:40 and ￿ = 0:83 ￿compared with the benchmark case of ￿ = 0:60: The
results for the perfect knowledge benchmark and for the case in which the central bank does
not communicate any information are reported in Tables 9 and 10 respectively. Results for
the cases in which the central bank publishes its in￿ ation forecasts and/or announces its
in￿ ation target are shown in Tables 11 to 15.27
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Figure 6: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:03. ￿ = 0:40.
26Varying the value of ￿ would a⁄ect the dynamics of in￿ ation in a qualitatively similar way.
27Note that in all cases except full information and rational expectations, the private sector is assumed
to have gains of ￿
v = ￿
f = 0:03.
22The results for ￿ = 0:40 are summarized in Figure 6. The qualitative results are broadly
similar to those discussed in the main part of the paper, although it is interesting to note
that reducing the responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation gap improves the relative
performance of the central bank￿ s forecasts. As a result, for the range of central bank gains
considered here, it is always bene￿cial for the central bank to publish its forecasts relative
to an alternative strategy of no communication. If we allow for the possibility that the
central bank may be able to announce its in￿ ation target, the bene￿t of the central bank
publishing economic forecasts is once again ambiguous.
The results for ￿ = 0:83 ￿summarized in Figure 7 ￿are qualitatively similar to those
in the benchmark case.
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Figure 7: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communicaiton strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:03. ￿ = 0:83.
5.2 Changing the private sector gain
As a further sensitivity analysis, consider the e⁄ects of changing the gains used by the
private sector. In particular, instead of the benchmark values of ￿ = ￿f = 0:03, consider
the e⁄ect of the private sector using signi￿cantly smaller (￿v = ￿f = 0:01) or larger (￿v
23= ￿f = 0:10) private sector gains.28 Results are reported in Figures 8 and 9, and Tables 16
to 19.































Central bank does not communictate any information
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Figure 8: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communication strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:01. ￿ = 0:60.
As would be expected, allowing the private sector to reduce its gain to only ￿v = ￿f =
0:01 greatly improves the precision of the private sector￿ s in￿ ation expectations; the RMSEs
under di⁄erent communication strategies shown in Figure 8 are noticeably lower than those
in the corresponding benchmark case. For it to be bene￿cial for the central bank to publish
its forecasts, the central bank￿ s gain now has to be very small.
The reverse is the case when the private sector is forced to use the relatively high gain
of ￿v = ￿f = 0:10, shown in Figure 9. Indeed, the extent of the private sector￿ s uncertainty
means that for the range of central bank gains considered here, it is now always bene￿cial
for the central bank to publish its forecasts.
28The responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation gap is set to the benchmark value of ￿ = 0:6.
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Figure 9: Private sector RMSEs under di⁄erent communication strategies. Private sector
gains are equal to 0:10. ￿ = 0:60.
5.3 Tables






Notes: Central bank and private sector both know all parameters of the model. Responsive-
ness of the output gap to the in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
255.3.1 Intermediate case: Private sector imperfect knowledge





0.01 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.03 1.006 1.006 1.006
0.05 1.012 1.012 1.012
Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation
gap is 0.60.
Table 3: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts.




0.01 0.247 0.999 1.002 0.999
0.03 0.250 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.05 0.249 1.002 1.019 1.003
Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation
gap is 0.60.
Table 4: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: E⁄ect of varying ￿f.




0.01 0.189 0.999 1.011 0.999
0.03 0.250 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.05 0.275 1.001 1.010 1.002
Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Private sector gain used to estimate AR(1) model is
0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
265.3.2 Main case: Central bank and private sector imperfect knowledge
Table 5: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: E⁄ect of varying ￿v and ￿cb.




0.01 0.00 0.301 0.999 1.002 0.999
0.01 0.02 0.610 1.002 1.002 1.005
0.01 0.04 0.698 1.003 1.003 1.014
0.01 0.06 0.715 1.003 1.003 1.022
0.01 0.08 0.718 1.003 1.004 1.027
0.01 0.10 0.722 1.003 1.0034 1.031
0.03 0.00 0.250 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.03 0.02 0.312 1.004 1.007 1.004
0.03 0.04 0.498 1.006 1.008 1.011
0.03 0.06 0.582 1.007 1.008 1.017
0.03 0.08 0.610 1.007 1.009 1.022
0.03 0.10 0.630 1.007 1.009 1.026
0.05 0.00 0.222 1.001 1.019 1.002
0.05 0.02 0.230 1.005 1.016 1.004
0.05 0.04 0.334 1.008 1.015 1.009
0.05 0.06 0.430 1.009 1.015 1.014
0.05 0.08 0.485 1.010 1.016 1.019
0.05 0.10 0.515 1.010 1.017 1.023
Notes: Private sector gain used to combine forecasts is 0.03. Responsiveness of the output
gap to the in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
27Table 6: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: E⁄ect of varying ￿f and ￿cb.




0.01 0.00 0.189 0.999 1.011 0.999
0.01 0.02 0.276 1.003 1.008 1.004
0.01 0.04 0.544 1.006 1.007 1.011
0.01 0.06 0.645 1.006 1.008 1.018
0.01 0.08 0.676 1.006 1.008 1.024
0.01 0.10 0.695 1.006 1.008 1.028
0.03 0.00 0.250 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.03 0.02 0.312 1.004 1.007 1.004
0.03 0.04 0.498 1.006 1.008 1.011
0.03 0.06 0.582 1.007 1.008 1.017
0.03 0.08 0.610 1.007 1.009 1.022
0.03 0.10 0.630 1.007 1.009 1.026
0.05 0.00 0.275 1.001 1.010 1.002
0.05 0.02 0.323 1.004 1.008 1.004
0.05 0.04 0.476 1.006 1.008 1.011
0.05 0.06 0.550 1.007 1.009 1.016
0.05 0.08 0.578 1.007 1.010 1.021
0.05 0.10 0.597 1.008 1.010 1.025
Notes: Private sector gain used to estimate AR(1) model is 0.03. Responsiveness of the
output gap to the in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
285.3.3 Communication strategies






Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Private sector gain used to estimate AR(1) model is
0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
Table 8: Central bank communicates in￿ ation target and in￿ ation forecasts: E⁄ects of
varying ￿cb.




0.00 0.254 1.000 1.003 1.000
0.02 0.552 1.002 1.002 1.003
0.04 0.705 1.004 1.003 1.011
0.06 0.720 1.004 1.003 1.018
0.08 0.721 1.004 1.004 1.023
0.10 0.723 1.004 1.004 1.027
Notes: Private sector gain is equal to 0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the in￿ ation
gap is 0.60.
295.3.4 Sensitivity analysis
Changing the structure of the economy





0.40 0.998 0.998 0.998
0.83 0.998 0.998 0.998
Notes: Central bank and private sector both know all parameters of the model.





0.40 1.006 1.006 1.006
0.83 1.006 1.006 1.006
Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Private sector gain used to estimate AR(1) model is
0.03.
Table 11: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: ￿=0.40.




0.00 0.40 0.246 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.02 0.40 0.315 1.004 1.008 1.004
0.04 0.40 0.463 1.005 1.008 1.009
0.06 0.40 0.521 1.006 1.009 1.013
0.08 0.40 0.540 1.006 1.009 1.015
0.10 0.40 0.557 1.006 1.010 1.018
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.40.
30Table 12: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: ￿=0.83.




0.00 0.83 0.251 1.000 1.010 1.001
0.02 0.83 0.307 1.004 1.008 1.004
0.04 0.83 0.504 1.007 1.007 1.012
0.06 0.83 0.609 1.008 1.008 1.020
0.08 0.83 0.650 1.008 1.009 1.027
0.10 0.83 0.672 1.008 1.009 1.034
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.83.





0.40 1.002 1.002 1.002
0.83 1.002 1.002 1.002
Notes: Central bank gain is equal to 0. Private sector gain used to estimate AR(1) model is
0.03.
Table 14: Central bank communicates in￿ ation target and in￿ ation forecasts: ￿=0.40.




0.00 0.40 0.253 1.000 1.003 1.000
0.02 0.40 0.531 1.002 1.002 1.003
0.04 0.40 0.653 1.003 1.003 1.009
0.06 0.40 0.653 1.003 1.004 1.013
0.08 0.40 0.654 1.004 1.004 1.015
0.10 0.40 0.666 1.004 1.004 1.018
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.40.
31Table 15: Central bank communicates in￿ ation target and in￿ ation forecasts: ￿=0.83.




0.00 0.83 0.256 1.000 1.003 1.000
0.02 0.83 0.559 1.002 1.002 1.003
0.04 0.83 0.724 1.004 1.002 1.011
0.06 0.83 0.756 1.005 1.003 1.020
0.08 0.83 0.759 1.005 1.004 1.028
0.10 0.83 0.759 1.005 1.004 1.035
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.03. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.83.
Changing the private sector gain
Table 16: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: ￿v=￿f=0.01.




0.00 0.247 0.999 1.002 0.999
0.02 0.698 1.001 1.001 1.006
0.04 0.787 1.001 1.002 1.018
0.06 0.805 1.001 1.002 1.026
0.08 0.808 1.001 1.002 1.031
0.10 0.811 1.001 1.002 1.035
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.01. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
Table 17: Central bank communicates in￿ ation target and in￿ ation forecasts: ￿v=￿f=0.01.




0.00 0.247 0.998 1.000 0.999
0.02 0.811 1.000 1.000 1.007
0.04 0.839 1.000 1.000 1.018
0.06 0.845 1.000 1.000 1.027
0.08 0.841 1.000 1.000 1.032
0.10 0.841 1.000 1.000 1.035
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.01. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
32Table 18: Central bank publishes in￿ ation forecasts: ￿v=￿f=0.10.




0.00 0.257 1.008 1.042 1.009
0.02 0.254 1.011 1.039 1.007
0.04 0.271 1.014 1.038 1.009
0.06 0.299 1.015 1.038 1.013
0.08 0.328 1.016 1.039 1.017
0.10 0.350 1.017 1.039 1.019
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.10. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
Table 19: Central bank communicates in￿ ation target and in￿ ation forecasts: ￿v=￿f=0.10.




0.00 0.264 1.006 1.020 1.008
0.02 0.253 1.009 1.018 1.003
0.04 0.315 1.011 1.018 1.005
0.06 0.401 1.012 1.018 1.009
0.08 0.446 1.012 1.018 1.013
0.10 0.473 1.013 1.019 1.016
Notes: Private sector gains are equal to 0.10. Responsiveness of the output gap to the
in￿ ation gap is 0.60.
33